Security is considered a challenge for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) due to the critical information transferred through the collection of smart sensor nodes forming the network. However, these nodes suffer from different limitations including memory available, computational and communicational limitations. Clustering these nodes is considered as one of the main solutions for prolonging the lifetime of the network. Low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH), stable election protocol (SEP) and hybrid energy efficient distributed clustering protocol (HEED) are considered the most famous clustering algorithms. In this paper, we propose a security framework called Virtual ECC group key (VEGK) merging elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with symmetric pairwise keys along with
Introduction
Recent developments in micro-electro mechanical system (MEMS) and wireless technologies allowed the usage of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in numerous applications efficiently including critical applications as battle field, wildfire and health monitoring [1] in which secure data transfer is essential. WSNs are typically composed of large number of smart sensor nodes deployed in the field, incorporate with each other for detecting, monitoring and reporting different environmental aspects. However, these motes suffer from limited energy source, small memory footprint and limited processing as well as limited communication capabilities. Thus, efficient energy protocols are introduced in different layers in WSNs.
Currently most of the WSNs are based on hierarchical structure to the nodes due to their efficient data processing while decreasing energy consumed. This leads to the introduction of many clustering algorithms [2] where nodes are organized into clusters. Clustering algorithms were proposed to balance energy drainage among nodes by randomly rotating cluster head (CH) memberships among all nodes. Each round has predetermined duration with two phases, setup phase where nodes elect CH and steadystate phase where nodes send data to their CHs. CHs are used to relay messages from ordinary nodes in the cluster to a certain base station (BS). One of the most famous clustering algorithms is low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) [3] , [4] . The idea behind LEACH is the formation of clusters based on received signal strength. The node becomes a CH for the current round if randomly generates a number less than certain threshold T (n) as given in (1) , where p is the desirable percentage to be CH, r is the current round while G is a set of nodes that have not been selected as CHs in previous rounds.
Another extension to LEACH is hybrid energy efficient distributed clustering protocol (HEED) proposed in [3] . HEED extends the selection of the CH using the residual energy of the node as a primary parameter. On the other hand it uses the network topology features as secondary parameter to break the tie among candidate CHs and to achieve power balancing between nodes. As given in 2, each node broadcasts its cost and performs neighbour discovery. Finally a node sets its probability to be CH:
where C prob is the initial percentage of CHs among n nodes, E residual is the residual energy in the node and E max is the initially max energy of the node.
As an extension to LEACH, stable election protocol (SEP) proposed in [5] , [6] . SEP is a heterogeneous-aware protocol, where a percentage of nodes equipped with more energy than the rest of nodes named "Advanced nodes", 1 aiming prolonging the stability period of the network that is the period before the death of the first node. SEP is based on weighted election probabilities on each node to become CH according to the residual energy as main factor. Using (3) and (4) normal and advanced nodes calculate their CH probability, respectively. Equations (5) and (6) state the threshold for CH selection for normal nodes and advanced nodes, respectively.
where r is the current round, G is the set of normal nodes haven't been CH during the current epoch, and G is the set of advanced nodes haven't been CH during the current sub-epoch. For life prolonging, SEP grouped rounds in larger unit called epoch, and sup-epoch given in (7) and (8) respectively. Normal node is CH once during each epoch, and advanced node is CH once during each sup-epoch.
LEACH and its extension, HEED and SEP, did not consider any security measures during their clustering operations. However, sensors might be deployed in unattended and insecure environments. Therefore, nodes might be physically captured and/or their messages might be intercepted and modified. Our security framework in this paper will be based on these clustering algorithms and any extension to LEACH will perfectly fit our security proposal. However, LEACH, SEP and HEED algorithms did not show how communication is established among the selected CHs as well as between the CHs and the BS/sink node. To guarantee the security in both phases of the algorithm, we propose a secure tree-based establishment among the CHs rooted at the BS.
The key problem of security algorithm specially the ones proposed for wireless networks is the key management.
The early schemes assumed that resource constraints on nodes prevent them from using traditional public key cryptography. Therefore, key materials should be pre-loaded in each node before deployment [7] , [8] . These previous schemes were mainly designed for homogeneous sensors and they take the flexibility offered by the public key cryptography based solutions, as node authentication, identity verification and authenticated broadcast [9] in addition to ensuring robustness. Fortunately enough, using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) as a lightweighted public key cryptography could be feasible for WSNs in which it depends on small key size and compact signatures required to achieve the needed security level.
A completely different approach is the usage of trusted third party, acts as a key distribution centre (KDC). Similar to the Needham-Schroeder protocol, KDC generates a unique secret key for two nodes upon request. However the establishment of a secret key is a side effect, where each node shares a long-term key with the KDC [10] , exerts high communication cost. Nodes located in the vicinity of the KDC have to forward all requests for link keys from the rest of the nodes, which drains the batteries of these nodes. On the other hand, Chan and Perrig [10] introduce peer intermediaries for key establishment (PIKE), a key establishment protocol uses ordinary nodes as trusted intermediaries for the generation of link keys. Both the communication cost and the memory overhead scale linearly with the number of nodes in the network.
Localized encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) proposes that each sensor node can establish pairwise keys with its immediate neighbour, during two phases named the key setup phase and key discovery phase. In the key setup phase, nodes receive a general key. Any node, using this key and one-way hash function, generates its master key. In the shared key discovery phase, nodes broadcast their ids, then each node can generate the shared key, simply by applying the hash function on the other node's id [11] . However the network security depends on the general key, which can be compromised by capturing of a single sensor node. It is possible to compromise all the session keys generated once this general key is compromised.
A real-time network architecture for biometric data delivery in ambient intelligence is proposed in [12] . Fingerprint, iris and voice data delivery are very critical and need real-time transmission network with QoS guaranteed. This work proposed hierarchical network of several independent wireless automation cells grouped in automation clusters. The key requirements are to identify people, monitor human presence and location in a secure way. Each automation cell is managed by a wireless controller that is connected to the backbone. Biometric traits are acquired through automation devices, installed in the environment. Automation device is a sensor and actuator node for acquiring information and to perform the final actions. Wireless cell coordinator is used to manage data transmission and to perform processing on biometric features. Cluster controller device manages and controls the activities between several independent wireless cells, directly connected to the wired backbone. Data integrity and confidentiality 2 between network modules is implemented using the AES, so that no clear biometric information is exchanged.
Secure energy-efficient routing protocol (SERP) proposed in [13] for densely deployed WSNs. SERP utilizes the available energy while ensuring secure data transmission to BS. Sink rooted tree is created as the network backbone based on the nodes' energy levels and their distances from the BS. One-way hash chain and pre-stored shared secret keys are used for ensuring security and avoid false injection of data. SERP includes an optional key refreshment mechanism which is an application dependable. Although SERP is very secure against injecting false data, but SERP assumes that both BS and nodes are loosely time synchronized and each node knows an upper bound on the maximum synchronization error, which is hardware accuracy dependable. SERP also assumes that, during the first phase of creating the tree structure, no node could be compromised by any adversary to avoid wrongly structured network. This is a hard assumption to be considered, especially for military applications. For the usage of the public key cryptography directly after deployment in our proposed scheme, the capture of any node will not affect the operation and the security of the rest of nodes at any phase.
Reza [14] introduced a key management scheme using ECC for cluster-based WSNs with a combination of number of ordinary sensor nodes and gateways. Gateways are considered more powerful nodes in terms of energy, processing capabilities and are assumed tamper-resistant nodes. Nodes also assumed to be aware of their locations in the monitored field either by using GPS or through one of the estimated methods. Before deployment phase, each gateway is pre-loaded with public keys of all other nodes in the field, its own public, private key, and the public key of the BS. An ordinary sensor node is assumed also to be pre-loaded with the public keys of all gateways as well as its own public and private keys. Rui [15] used the same concept while merging the ECC with t-degree trivariate symmetric polynomial. The algorithm considered a node to be either H sensor with high power or L sensor with lower power. H sensor assumed to have larger storage space and also assumed to be tamper proof. Each L sensor node is pre-loaded with public keys of all H sensors. In addition, H sensor is pre-loaded with the public key of all L sensors and the public and private keys of all H sensors including itself.
Both [14] and [15] as well other schemes propose static membership for nodes and assume nodes with either high or low power levels must store some set of public keys of other nodes in the network. Certainly a large overhead is introduced especially with large-scale networks which is the common case for WSNs. In addition, both assume that nodes are tamper proofed which is costly to be considered in WSNs.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for key management in heterogeneous cluster-based WSNs using hybrid key management technique between the lightweight public key cryptography ECC and short pairwise symmetric key called VEGK. Symmetric keys are assigned dynamically, to establish secure links of communication between nodes and their CH and between CH with either BS or other CH. The CHs are organized in hierarchy of clusters, with the BS at the root of the tree. Our proposed scheme in this paper takes the advantage of CH membership rotation proposed by LEACH algorithm, with no assumption of the costly tamper proof of certain nodes. Small memory storage is required to store the public keys as will be discussed in Section 3. In addition, it requires small expansion for ECC encryption techniques which is reasonable for wireless nodes as will be proved in the performance analysis section. Such extra space as well as computations is incomparable to security level that will be achieved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces VEGK scheme; network maintenance analysis to different scenarios is elaborated in Section 3; the performance analysis to the proposed scheme is elaborated in Section 4; finally this paper is concluded in Section 5.
Virtual ECC Group Key
In this section, we introduce our security scheme. The aim is to secure heterogeneous sensor networks using hybrid key management technique of the lightweight public key cryptography (ECC) and short pairwise symmetric key. Our proposed algorithm falls into five phases. These phases modify LEACH to add the security to the network and connectivity among selected CHs. The phases are as follows.
Phase 1: Pre-deployment Key Distribution
Initially, before sensor node deployment, the network is divided into k virtual groups 1 ≤ G i ≤ k, where G i is the group identifier (i). Each group is assigned ECC public key P U Gi and private key P R Gi . In addition, each sensor node is assumed to be preset with some of the required key materials. Moreover, each node is randomly assigned to a single group regardless its positions in the monitored field. Consequently, each node is pre-loaded with the corresponding group identifier G i , its private keys P RG i , and the public keys of all of the k groups. All these ECC keys are signed by the BS as group key pairs. Nevertheless, each node is assumed to be pre-loaded with a unique identifier N i in addition to ECC private key P RN i and public key P UN i pairs. Both keys are also signed by the BS as its own key pairs. Nodes are assumed to be capable of running the ECDSA algorithm [6] for authentication and checking the valid authenticity of any other public key certificate.
Phase 2: Neighbours Discovery
Directly after the random deployment of the nodes, each node broadcasts a message with low power level L to be heard by small number of neighbours. These announcements could be on the following format:
As shown in (9) , each node broadcasts a message holding its group id that was previously assigned to it, its public key and its own id encrypted by the private key of its group. All other nodes within the range can decrypt the message using the corresponding group public key. At the same time they save the received node id and its public key for future communication.
Phase 3: CH Announcement
During LEACH setup phase, all nodes capable to operate as CHs for the current round, using (1), announce themselves as CHs to their neighbours. These announcements could be on the following format:
As shown in (10), each of the candidates CH broadcasts a message holding its unique id and "Candidate-CH" code encrypted using its own private key. This message is broadcasted with a low power level L. The node might select its potential CH based on one or more criteria such as received signal strength (RSSI), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), CH ID, or any other criteria. Nodes that are not selected as CHs for the current phase can safely delete the private key of its group from its internal memory. However, they still can communicate with new nodes by decrypting their messages with the public key of the corresponding group.
Phase 4: CHs Tree Construction
After the CHs were chosen in the previous phase, a tree rooted at the BS is constructed in this phase. The main purpose of constructing such tree is to guarantee the connectivity of the network as well as helping ensuring the security. Any selected CH joins the tree by sending a Join-Tree-Request message that contains its own public key, id, and random value (nonce to avoid replay attack) encrypted with the private key of its group. This message will be sent using a power level R which is greater than L. Other CHs decrypt and save the messages heard then verify the received public keys, with no immediate reply.
Once the BS hears from the closest CHs, it saves their ids and verifies their public keys. Then, the BS replies with Accept-Tree-Joining or Reject-Tree-Joining message based on received public key verification. Sometimes, the CH capability cannot handle more than certain number of CHs; so the Reject-Tree-Joining message is set for that purpose too. Accept-Tree-Joining message consists of "first level" notification, session key and f (Nonce) where f is certain function exerted on the Nonce ensuring the authorization of the sender. This message is encrypted using node's public key of the received identifier. Consequently, the first level CHs, will reply to all previously saved CHs, with "second level" notification message. The message contains session key and f (Nonce) encrypted using node's public key of the received identifier. Figure 1 shows the steps taken by the CHs in this phase.
This process is repeated till a tree of CHs is constructed, as shown in Fig. 2 . To avoid looping during the construction of the tree, any CH must have one lower numbered node (in terms of tree level) as parent CH and any higher CH ID as children. Before branching to the next phase, now each CH can safely delete the private key of its group from the internal memory. However the CH still can communicate with new nodes by decrypting their messages with the public key of the corresponding group.
Phase 5: Clusters Formation
Till this point, each CH knows its level in the tree. At the same time, each node knows the id and the public key of its CH. To form the clusters, each CH sends Join-Me request to all of its neighbours with power level L. This message now is encrypted by its private key and contains its identifier, a new random number (nonce), the CH tree level (M ), and the Join-Me code. Nodes can decrypt this message and verifies their identifiers. Such scenario is illustrated in (11) . The node replies to the CH with Join-Accept message encrypted by the public key of the CH. This message contains the node identifier, f(Nonce), a new nonce, and Join-Accept code as given in (12) . Now, clusters are formed as well as the tree is established. However, instead of using public and private key pair for further transmission between the nodes and their CH one extra message (S-Key message) is transmitted from the CH to its cluster nodes. This message is used to notify the nodes by their session keys for the current round. In addition, along with the message, a CH can associate the time slot for each CH member due to the used TDMA in the steady-state phase. The S-Key message is shown in (13) .
Based on this flow of messages, no reply attack can take place even if each node broadcasts its public key not encrypted. Certainly, this is due to the encrypted random numbers (Nonce) in (11), (12) and (13).
Network Maintenance
In this section, we introduce some possible maintenance scenarios and how these scenarios can be handled by our hierarchal security scheme.
Re-clustering
Part of the LEACH algorithm is the re-clustering after certain period of time avoiding the previous CHs to be selected once more. Therefore, new CH announces itself by broadcasting a message contains its ID and its current CH as well as its current cluster level in the tree with power L. Any node hears this announcement sends a verification message to the specified node's current CH using the previously established session key assuming the new CH is one of the neighbours. However, in some cases, this new CH might not be one of the neighbours. Therefore a node has to go through a chain verification sequence to reach the current CH. Once the current CH verifies the new CH, nodes start to deal with it safely. Figure 3 shows this verification process. Again, to form a tree among the new CHs, new CHs send a Join-Tree-Request and the old CHs can verify their honesty either by contacting the specified CH or by going up to the BS. Then CHs tree construction phase is continued.
Adding New Node Protocol
It is essential to add new nodes due to the holes in the monitored field or even for fault tolerance in a secure way and close the door of an intruder to fraud the network. Therefore, our main assumption in adding new node is that any new node has to be registered at the BS before adding it to the network which is a reasonable assumption. The new node, after its deployment, sends a New-JoinRequest including its ID, its public key and a random nonce encrypted with its group private key. All of the new nodes' neighbours can decrypt the message using the previously stored virtual groups' public keys. They also reply with their public keys beside their ids encrypted with the corresponding group public key. The closest CHs reply by Join-Me message as given previously in (11) . The node replices to one of them by a Join-Accept message as in (12) . Then the CH replies byS-Key message for a session key establishment as given in (13) (Fig. 4) . 
Removing a Node Protocol
A dead node can be recognized by not sending data during its time slot for number of iterations. CH then broadcasts message holding the node's id and its public key informing cluster members that this node is dead who will in turn mark this node with no further communication even if it comes back to life. This introduces difficulty on the intruder, who physically compromises a node.
Orphan Adoption Protocol
It is assumed that there is a mean for nodes to detect the unavailability of their CH like using the concept of watchdog [16] . Once the nodes recognize that they are now orphan they broadcast an Orphan-Adoption request that 5 Figure 5 . Orphan adoption protocol.
will be heard by all of the current CHs in their ranges. The close CHs propagate this message to the BS for verification. Once verified, the CHs now offer the node to join their clusters and the node reply by its acceptance to one of them (Fig. 5) .
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. Experiments are performed using our own simulator written on Matlab. We use N = 1000 as the number of node deployed in an area A = 1000 × 1000 m 2 . Nodes transmission range is set to L = 100 m while the CHs transmission range is set to R = 300 m for communication between CHs along the tree. We implemented our own simulator because our proposed algorithm targets dense sensor networks of thousand nodes and more. Although simulators like NS-2 or JSim are efficient, we experienced big latency in clustering and building the secure tree in each phase for the dense networks compared to Matlab.
Storage Analysis
As noticed in our proposal, each sensor node should be pre-loaded with its own public and private keys in addition to the private and public keys of its randomly assigned virtual group. After bootstrapping and clustering, each sensor node receives the public key of its m neighbour nodes, where m is the number of expected neighbours of each node that can be computed on average as given in (14) [14] :
Add to the previous equation a session key with CH. Also, it is worth mentioning that the private key of the group is considered as temporary key in which it is removed once the session key is established. Moreover, it is clear that the total number of keys is not the same for all nodes since CHs change every round. CHs usually hold an addition m session keys, the public key and the session key for upper parent CH as well as n public keys and session keys for lower children CHs due to the tree structure. Nevertheless, the session keys require only small memory storage.
To prove the superiority of our proposed scheme, the proposed scheme is compared to the ones proposed in [14] and Rui [15] , it is assumed that gateways and H sensors as well as CHs represents 10% of the total nodes while K represents 1% of the network density. Consider Reza scheme, each gateway is pre-loaded with public keys of all other nodes in the field, its own public, private key, and the public key of the BS. An ordinary sensor node is pre-loaded with the public keys of all gateways as well as its own public and private keys. Also for Rui scheme, each L sensor node is pre-loaded with public keys of all H sensors. In addition, H sensor is pre-loaded with the public key of all L sensors and the public and private keys of all H sensors including itself. It is clear from the table that our proposed scheme, VEGK, provides huge save in terms of required keys to be saved by each node. Consequently, it saves the memory required for the pre-loaded ECC keys for each node. On the other hand, both Reza and Rui schemes require huge number of keys especially with large-scale networks. For instance, the gateway is required to hold 9003 keys and the H nodes are required to save 11,003 keys when a network of 10,000 nodes are constituted. On the other hand, only 185 keys are required to be carried by the CH of VEGK scheme.
The huge number of nodes is the typical sizes for WSNs needed to monitor large important military or agricultural areas or to monitor dangerous signs before catastrophic collapsing of large buildings and bridges. Also this large number is needed to decrease the gaps between nodes.
Energy Overhead
To test our proposed algorithms, the used energy model follows the footsteps of the one proposed in [17] . In addition, for simplicity, the size of the message sent by a node to its CH as well as that of the aggregated message sent by the CH is set to 4000 bit message. A160-bit Figure 6 . The average energy of the node using: (a) LEACH and the proposed scheme and (b) SEP and the proposed scheme.
ECC as the key primitive is computed according to the experiments done in [18] . 40 bytes used for public key and 20 bytes used for private key as well as 12 bytes for node's id. In addition, the ECDSA takes only 56.4 KB from ROM and 1.7 KB RAM. Moreover, the verification process takes 2.85 s on MICAz node. The ECC usage possibility on WNSs was proved in [19] . The author built their analysis on Berkeley/Crossbow motes platform. They use Mica2dot and found that ECDSA-160 and 224 are more efficient in terms of security energy consumed on signing and ECC operations compared to the RSA-1024 and 2048.
Based on the previous setup, Fig. 6 (a) and (b) shows the average residual energy (the average of the residual energy of all nodes in the network) per iteration (each iteration is composed of setup and steady-state phase) using the basic LEACH and SEP against that of VEGK and the proposed CH tree. The graph assumed that both CHs for the basic protocols and un-clustered nodes for both VEGK and the proposed protocols communicate directly with the BS, which leads to faster decay of the network, as shown in the figure in the linear decrease of the residual energy.
As shown in figure, the amount of energy consumed (the current average residual energy compared to the initial average residual energy) by the proposed secure VEGK and CH tree is close enough to that of the basic protocols. In other words, the life time of network using the basic clustering protocols is nearly the same as using the secure VEGK and the proposed CH tree. The consumed energy due to security turned to be unnoticeable, because the proposed CH tree reduced energy consumption of the nodes and can be negligible with the gain of secure communication.
Security Analysis
After bootstrapping, each node enters neighbours' discovery phase to receive the public keys of the neighbours. During clustering phase, nodes agree on one session key with its CH that allows verification of the identities of the nodes, while the adversary is unable to impersonate the identity except by capturing the node. So this hybrid method supports data confidentiality, integrity and node authentication. The usage of public key cryptography gives the security issue more power and flexibility of creating and updating session keys besides node authentication, identity verification and authenticated broadcast. Public key cryptography prevents a huge set of famous attacks on the network as selective forwarding, Flooding, Sinkhole and Sybil attack, in addition to the replay attack which is prevented using nonce. Obviously capturing node reveals no information about the links that are not directly involved in communication with the compromised node as no reveal for their private keys; so it does not affect the security of the rest of the nodes. The CH membership rotation besides the proposed handling to the node removal exerts additional difficulty. The intruder faces high difficulty in identifying CHs and capturing them. Thus no need to tamper proof nodes, which is considered of high cost, making VEGK to be cost efficient compared to Reza scheme [14] and Rui [15] .
For power proof, we introduce some possible attack scenarios and how network will be secured using our scheme. Figure 7 declares the attacking scenario, if the attacker does not have the public and private key pair of any group Figure 7 . The attack scenario and how nodes can withstand. 7 of the k groups signed by the BS, so will be discarded by neighbours from the first step by using ECDSA and will not be able to join the CHs tree. Assuming the attacker got at least single group key pair and does not have private and public key pair signed by the BS for his own usage, the attacker will be discarded from the first step by neighbours using ECDSA to verify the sent public key. Assuming the attacker was able to fake the tree level indicator without being aware of the nonce function used for authentication, he/she will be discarded by neighbours in the last step for the incorrect value of the calculated nonce. Sinkhole attack, where fake sinkhole is created advertising for high quality routes, leads to almost all traffic to be attracted [20] . Our scheme can withstand using public key encryption and nonce, unless the attacker has a public and private key signed by the BS in addition to public and private key of one of the K groups. HELLO flood attack, where nodes broadcast small packets after deployment for neighbour discovery, the attacker can simply advertises high quality route by advertising him/herself as CH or powerful node [20] . Our proposed scheme can withstand by encrypted HELLO messages as shown in phase 2 for bidirectional link verification. Selective forwarding attack, where the compromised nodes might forward selected packets to get neighbours' trust in the multi-hop fashion and might simply drop these packets. Our proposed scheme dealing with node removal in the network maintenance section can efficiently withstand this attack by simply discarding the compromised node even if it comes back to life.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a secure key management scheme for heterogonous hierarchical cluster-based WSN. Our proposal uses a hybrid key management technique of the lightweight public key cryptography ECC and pair-wise symmetric key cryptography for LEACH-based clustering algorithm. Our scheme introduces a significant save in the required key materials to achieve full network connectivity compared to other schemes. The proposed scheme achieves high security level by using public key cryptography for node authentication, identity verification and broadcast authentication. In addition, short session keys are used after verification for future secure communication to support data confidentiality and integrity. In addition our security scheme reduces the risk on other nodes in case of node capture. Finally, the proposed scheme securely deals with various cases like adding new nodes, removing nodes, orphan nodes and re-clustering.
